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Jerome Powell’s Quest For Economic Stability Is Destabilizing

Jerome Powell’s Quest For Economic Stability Is Destabilizing

Authored by Richard Ebeling via The American Institute for Economic Research,

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This article was originally published by Zero Hedge
Jerome Powell's Quest For Economic Stability Is Destabilizing

Authored by Richard Ebeling via The American Institute for Economic Research,

When the chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank speaks the financial markets listen, and this was no different with Jerome Powell’s virtual address to the annual meeting of central bankers at Jackson Hole, Wyoming. What they got is what Harry Truman complained about when hearing from his economic advisors: “On the one hand, ‘this,’ but on the other hand, ‘that’.” Truman said that he desperately wanted a one-handed economist.

After a decade of general economic calm most of the time, with modest to reasonable growth, relatively low price inflation, and, at the beginning of 2020 before the Coronavirus lockdowns, unemployment at its lowest level in half a century, everyone is now worried about what to expect from the Federal Reserve in terms of monetary and interest rate policy in the months and years ahead in the face of all that has been happening for the last year and a half.

Whipsaw GDP and Huge Government Expenditures

After a staggering decline in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from $19.2 trillion in the fourth quarter of 2019 to $17.2 trillion in the second quarter of 2020, or a 9 percent decrease of real GDP in a matter of a few months, the latest revised estimate by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for the second quarter of 2021 is that real GDP reached $19.36 trillion. This was a 12.5 percent increase over its 2020 low, and a level now above its pre-Coronavirus high.

It is worth keeping in mind, however, that all of these numbers are exaggerated in terms of real private sector vibrancy because in 2019, federal government expenditures came to $4.45 trillion, or 23 percent of that $19.2 trillion GDP total. By the end of 2020, due to the relaxing of the federal and state lockdown and shutdown mandates over much of the U.S. economy in the second half of last year, real GDP had recovered to $18.76 trillion, but federal government expenditures came to $6.6 trillion, or 35 percent of that total GDP. And just in the first half of 2021, out of that $19.36 trillion GDP, federal spending has already been $5.86 trillion of that total, or 30.2 percent.

If government spending is even partly discounted from GDP as a false indicator of the economic “health” of the U.S., since Uncle Sam has nothing to spend other than what it either first taxes away from the private sector or has borrowed from the financial markets, the private economy is far from doing as well as the GDP numbers suggest.

Lagging Unemployment and Rising Price Inflation

After unemployment had reached a low of 3.5 percent of the labor force at the start of 2020, it rose to almost 15 percent in April of last year, due to the government-commanded halt of a huge amount of economic activity. In July 2021, unemployment had declined to 5.4 percent of the labor force; but this still left it almost 55 percent above its low at the beginning of 2020. 

After the Consumer Price Index (CPI) mostly fluctuated in a relatively narrow range of between one and two percent, annually, over the last ten years, 2021 has seen the CPI increase to 5.4 percent in July of this year. Certain subgroups, such as energy and used car automotive sectors increased in double digit ranges on an annualized basis.    

With unemployment still considered high, with the CPI increasing noticeably above the decade-long annual average, and question marks concerning how GDP will grow for the remainder of this year, given continuing supply-chain disruptions and uncertainties about the impact of variations and new mutations of the Coronavirus, all eyes and ears turned to Jerome Powell’s pronouncements about the future direction of Federal Reserve monetary and interest rate policy.

Powell’s Maybe This, Maybe That, Policy Pronouncement

And what he said was that the Federal Reserve Board of Governors has not decided what to do!

On the one hand, the economy is improving so, perhaps, before the end of the year, the Fed will reduce its current monthly purchase of $120 billion worth of assets – $80 billion of U.S. government securities, and $40 billion of mortgage-backed securities. And it may decide that it is time to no longer use its policy tools to keep key interest rates close to zero.

On the other hand, recent price inflation may only be a transitory spurt due to supply-side problems, so the concern about accelerating price increases may be misplaced. Therefore, it may be premature to reduce asset purchases too quickly and certainly it is necessary to be cautious in any nudging up of interest rates that might cut short the national economic recovery before unemployment has been reduced, once again, to a level closer to standard benchmarks of “full employment.”

On the one hand, the worst of the Coronavirus may have passed, so there may be no new shutdown hurdles in the way of continuing improvement as reflected in the usual macroeconomic measurements. On the other hand, virus variants may prevent a smooth path to a fully restored and growing economy. So, it may be too soon to really specify when and by how much asset purchases will be reduced or by how much those interest rates will be raised from their current near zero levels.

The Fed Chairman also said that, on the one hand, the Fed leadership has plenty of experience and policy tools to keep the economy on a sound and even path. On the other hand, such things as the impact of the Coronavirus and the threats facing the world from global warming are unique, making charting the Fed policy course a distinct challenge.

Powell’s Reticence and the Political Business Cycle

In other words, Jerome Powell evaded any straightforward policy program, and therefore offered something for almost everyone, in terms of easing fears and concerns that either the policy foot will stay too long where it is on the accelerator or will start putting on the brakes too quickly. Either he is being reticent due to honest doubts about what he thinks is ahead for the economy, or he knows how to play to the audience in the White House and in Congress who will decide whether or not he is appointed for a second term as chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. After all, you don’t want to seem to be planning any clear policy moves that might threaten the reelection of Senators or Congressmen in the 2022 elections, or antagonize a president who does not want to lose his thin majority in the national legislature.

That politicians and central bankers are sensitive to the phases of the business cycle as they may impact the political electoral cycle in thinking about their policy decisions and directions has been understood by some economists at least since Johan Akerman’s (1896-1982) analysis of the “Political Economic Cycle” (Kyklos, May 1947), in which he traced out observed changes in those running governments in democratic societies resulting from the phases in the business cycle, and how those in government attempt to manage public policy to maintain their political positions.

Historically, Akerman said, looking over the period from the mid-19th century to 1945 in countries like Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and Sweden, the result of the analysis could be summarized in the following way: “All general economic depressions in England . . . lead to cabinet crises and a change of the party in power . . . In the United States the presidential elections as a rule involve a change in party control when votes are cast during a depression and a maintenance of the party in office when the votes are cast during periods of prosperity,” in sixteen of the twenty elections between 1865 and 1945.

Governments, Akerman also pointed out, try “to stabilize financial and economic conditions, and for a brief period may succeed in doing so.” While not pursuing it in his article, the fact is that the underlying circumstances that create “booms” that result in “busts” are usually of the government’s own policy. making. The “good times” monetary and fiscal policies finally create the economic crises that threaten the political policy-makers’ positions in authority. Hence, a government’s frequent demise in the next election when a recession or depression finally occurs. (p. 107)

Interest Rates Should Coordinate Savings and Investment

But this gets to the real essence of the dilemma in Jerome Powell’s statement of Federal Reserve policy and its possible future direction. The underlying presumption is that a central bank can and should be attempting to manage the monetary system and the level of interest rates in the financial markets and, therefore, trying to macro-manage the society as a whole.

Let us start with interest rates. The role of market prices is to bring into coordinated balance the two sides of demand and supply. Prices do so by effectively informing those needing to know on the supply side what is it that demanders want and the value they place upon it in terms of what they are willing to pay to get it; prices, at the same time, inform demanders what suppliers can and are willing to produce and offer for sale, and at what price reflecting the producer’s opportunity costs of bringing a particular good or service to market. The competitive interaction of those two sides of the market brings about the balance between them.

The role of interest rates is to do the same for borrowers and lenders. It is the trading of the use of resources across time between those who are interested and willing to defer the more immediate use of resources (expressed in money) in their possession or under their control, in return for a premium in the future from those interested in more immediate uses of those resources beyond their own capacity in exchange for paying such a premium in the future. That premium is the rate of interest, which may vary with the duration of the loan and risk elements in extending it.

The role of the rate of interest is to coordinate the willingness of savers with the desires of borrowers. Any rate of interest above or below this results in, respectively, an excess of savings over investment demand or an excess of investment demand over available savings.

Manipulating Interests Rates Distorts Markets

The crucial difference between a price, say, for hats that is set below the market-clearing, or coordinating, level is that a shortage results with some willing buyers leaving the market empty-handed; but when the Federal Reserve, or any central bank, wishes to manipulate interest rates below the market coordinating level, it fills the gap with newly created money with which loans may be extended in excess of actual savings in the economy.

This not only results in an increase in the number of units of the medium of exchange through which buyers can express their greater demand for desired goods and services, tending, in general, to place upward pressure on overall market prices. It also influences the structure of relative prices and wages, since increases in the supply of money can only enter the economy through the increased demand for the particular goods, resources, and services those borrowers of that new money wish to purchase and use. But the money is then passed to another group of hands; that is, those who have sold those goods, resources and services to the borrowers. This second group, in turn, spends the new money that they have received from sales on other goods, resources and services for which they wish to increase their demand.

Step-by-step, in a patterned sequence through time, the newly created money increases the demands and the prices of one set of goods and services, and then another, and then another, until, finally, in principle, all prices for finished goods and the factors of production will have been impacted to one degree or another, at different times in the sequence, with changes in relative profit margins and employment opportunities for as long as the monetary inflationary process continues.

This also means that whenever the monetary expansion stops or slows down, or even, perhaps, fails to accelerate, the resulting patterned use of labor, resources, and capital equipment brought into existence due to the way the money has entered into the economy and is being spent, period-after-period, begins to fall apart. This precipitates a readjustment process during which it is discovered that labor, capital and resources have been directed into allocated and applied for uses that are unsustainable once the inflationary process comes to an end.

The Fed’s Monetary Expansion and Bank Reserve Tricks

For over ten years, since the financial and housing crisis of 2008-2009, the Federal Reserve has been dramatically expanding the money supply. In January 2008, the Monetary Base (loanable reserves in the banking system plus currency in general circulation) equaled $837 billion; by August 2014, the Monetary Base had been expanded to over $4 trillion. In February 2020, just before the Coronavirus crisis impacted the U.S. in terms of the government mandated lockdowns and shutdowns, it still was historically high at $3.45 trillion; but by July 2021, the Monetary Base stood at $6.13 trillion, or a nearly 78 percent increase just in the last year and a half.

Why has there not been the expected general price inflation from such a huge increase in the money supply through the banking system? Because the Federal Reserve has been paying banks not to fully lend the loanable reserves at their disposal. As a result, as of July 2021, banks were holding “excess reserves,” (that is, reserves above the minimum Federal Reserve rules require banks to hold against possible cash withdrawals by their depositors), of around $3.9 trillion, upon which the Federal Reserve pays those banks an interest rate of 0.15 percent. In other words, 63 percent of the Monetary Base is being held off the active loan market.

Given that real GDP in the United States has increased by over 25 percent since 2010, and the velocity of circulation of money (number of times money turns over in transactions per period of time), has decreased by almost 40 percent over the last ten years or so, it is not too surprising that prices in general have not been rising more, or more rapidly, given these countervailing factors, plus the Federal Reserve’s “trick” of paying banks to not lend all the huge amount of bank reserves their open market operations have created during the past decade.

Markets Still Distorted, Even with Low Price Inflation

It is nonetheless the case, that through its continuing large purchases of U.S. treasuries and mortgage-backed securities, market interest rates have been artificially pushed significantly below any rates of interest that would prevail on financial markets not manipulated in this manner.

It is not unreasonable to ask what informational role market interest rates have been even playing about the real underlying savings and investment borrowing relationship in the economy in such a setting. Federal Reserve monetary and interest rate policy has undermined any reasonably accurate intertemporal price to coordinate saving with borrowing.

Another way of saying this is that the Federal Reserve’s monetary central planning has virtually abolished a market-based pricing system for the allocation and use of resources across time. How can anyone easily know what real savings is available to fund investment and other loan uses in a way that is not throwing the economy out of serious balance?

In the name of trying to steer the economic “ship” to assure growing GDP, moderate price inflation, and “full employment” of the labor force, Jerome Powell and his fellow Fed Board members are, in fact, setting the stage for an eventual economic downturn by distorting a series of interconnected “microeconomic” relationships in the name of “macroeconomic” stability.

When the Fed chairman cautiously suggests that the American central bankers are not sure what they are going to do, it is because they cannot do what they say they want to do. By trying to pursue their declared goals through the monetary and interest rate policy tools at their disposal, they are, in fact, continuing to imbalance and wrongly “twist” the real economy in ways that will result in the instability, and the eventual recession and likely price inflation they say they wish to prevent.

Tyler Durden Sun, 09/05/2021 - 15:30

Economics

US indices close week mixed, weighed down by tech stocks

Benchmark US indices closed the trading week mixed on Friday September 24 pulled down by losses in technology and healthcare sectors amid mixed global…

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Benchmark US indices closed the trading week mixed on Friday, September 24, pulled down by losses in technology and healthcare sectors amid mixed global cues.

The S&P 500 was up 0.15% to 4,455.48. The Dow Jones rose 0.10% to 34,798.00. The NASDAQ Composite fell 0.03% to 15,047.70, and the small-cap Russell 2000 was down 0.49% to 2,248.07.

Global markets remained volatile this week amid mixed cues. US stocks wavered after news that Chinese real estate giant Evergrande Group was on the brink of a major default.

Its US$300 billion debt bomb has sent shockwaves across the global markets. On Thursday, it entered a 30-day grace period after missing an interest payment deadline.

The Fed's sooner-than-expected timeline for stimulus tapering also weighed on investors' minds. The central bank said this week that it is considering withdrawing its bond-buying program by November. Consequently, an interest rate hike may be imminent.

Separately, the Biden administration is also planning to increase the corporate tax. It is currently debating a spending bill, which is expected to outline the program.

On Friday, the energy and financial stocks were the top gainers on S&P 500 index. Real estate and healthcare stocks were the bottom movers. Six of the 11 index segments stayed in the green.

Shares of Nike, Inc (NKE) fell 6.17% after it lowered its sales forecast. The company said it is facing challenges to meet the demand for shoes and athlete wear due to delays in production and shipping. Nevertheless, its revenue jumped 16% YoY to US$12.2 billion in Q1, FY22.

Meredith Corporation (MDP) stock rose 25.27 percent after news that the magazine publisher is in advanced talks for its purchase by media and internet holding company IAC/InterActiveCorp.

In the healthcare sector, Moderna Inc. (MRNA) fell 4.65%, Dexcom Inc. (DXCM) shed 2.25%, and Waters Corporation (WAT) fell 1.78%. Resmed Inc. (RMD) and Boston Scientific Corporation (BSX) ticked down 1.37% and 1.06%, respectively.

In technology stocks, Enphase Energy Inc (ENPH) declined 3.04%, NVIDIA Corp (NVDA) fell 1.89%, and Adobe Inc. (ADBE) declined 1.48%. Accenture plc (ACN) shed 1.20%, and Salesforce.com Inc. (CRM) gained 2.47%.

In the energy sector, ConocoPhillips (COP) rose 2.43%, EOG Resources Inc. (EOG) gained 2.45%, and Baker Hughes Co (BKR) gained 1.25%. Hess Corporation (HES) and Pioneer Natural Resources Company (PXD) advanced 1.10 and 3.21%, respectively.

In the crypto market, prices tumbled after the Central Bank of China declared crypto transactions illegal. Bitcoin (BTC) fell 5.49%, Ethereum (ETH) fell 7.74%, and Dogecoin (DOGE) declined 6.82%.

Also read: With chipmakers in the spotlight, here’s a peek at five of them

Also read: Top five communication stocks that rode the Q2 rebound

Six of the 11 segments of the S&P 500 index stayed in the green.

Also read: Why are Salesforce (CRM), Affirm (AFRM) stocks in limelight today?

 Futures & Commodities

Gold futures were up 0.03% to US$1,750.40 per ounce. Silver decreased by 1.21% to US$22.405 per ounce, while copper rose 1.20% to US$4.2817.

Brent oil futures increased by 1.04% to US$78.05 per barrel and WTI crude was up 0.93% to US$73.98.

Also Read: In the Spotlight: Top 50 US startups in 2021

Bond Market

The 30-year Treasury bond yields was up 3.15% to 1.985, while the 10-year bond yields rose 3.02% to 1.453.

US Dollar Futures Index increased by 0.27% to US$93.278.

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Economics

China Is Responsible For More Than A Third Of World GDP Growth – This Is A Problem

China Is Responsible For More Than A Third Of World GDP Growth – This Is A Problem

As Deutsche Bank’s FX strategist George Saravelos writes…

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China Is Responsible For More Than A Third Of World GDP Growth - This Is A Problem

As Deutsche Bank's FX strategist George Saravelos writes in a recent research report he has been "on the pessimistic side of the reflation narrative for some time now."

In the note titled "three charts for pessimists", he admits that there are many more things happening to the global economy than easy fiscal and monetary policy, including a large negative supply-shock, in turn leading to sizeable demand destruction; stronger than expected precautionary saving behavior from consumers pushing down r*; and massive structural economic change on the back of COVID-led digitization across multiple sectors. And now we have to add China to the mix.

His first chart below highlights a simple observation: China has been acting as a massive global growth turbocharge since the start of the century, and is responsible for more than a third of world GDP growth. As Saravelos gloomily notes, "systemic risks of the unfolding property developer crisis aside, if the last few months experience are signaling a regime break in Chinese tolerance for what authorities have termed "low quality" growth, the world should take notice."

Back to the developed world, Saravelos' second chart shows there is still a massive hole in the UK labor market. Total hours worked are a whopping near-10% below trend compared to pre-COVID. Yet the market is now fully pricing a Bank of England rate hike early next year. For sure, wages are rising, but as a recent IFS study showed there are still massive disruptions in the UK labor market. It will take a brave central bank to hike in to such a hole. Even if it does, it is hardly positive for the currency.

Finally, there are two parallel universes. The global goods sector is overheated. Look no further than US consumption, which is half a trillion dollars above trend. But the US services sector is twice as large and half a trillion below trend. The analytical value of aggregate GDP metrics is severely lessened in the presence of such massive sectoral dislocations. In recent months, the goods sector has started decelerating faster than the services sector has quickened. How the consumer rebalances spending in coming months will be very important.

We are only at the very beginning of trying to understand the true post-COVID steady state, it will be a long ride.

Tyler Durden Fri, 09/24/2021 - 20:20
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Economics

Finally The Taper Tantrum, Or What’s Wrong With August?

If you’re fortunate to be able to do this long enough, you’re absolutely assured to get caught with your pants down and almost certainly more than once….

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If you’re fortunate to be able to do this long enough, you’re absolutely assured to get caught with your pants down and almost certainly more than once. In the short run, it’s all a crapshoot anyway. Markets fluctuate and never, ever go in a straight line. And just when you claim to be right on top, they yank the rug right out from under your conceit(s).

I’ve spent the past few weeks, really months pointing out how Federal Reserve policymakers via their compliant media hasn’t been able to provoke anything out of bonds. Not for lack of trying. Zilch. Nada. Forget tantrum, a whole lot of nothing even though taper – we’re always told – would spell the death of the bond “bull.” I’ve been almost gleefully highlighting how this policy farce has been greeted as a complete non-issue across all of those markets.

Until yesterday.

Finally, yields backed up both then and today in a notable selloff. Is this the long-awaited tantrum? Could it be something else?

For the former, start with Fed Governor Christopher Waller. Recall on August 2nd how Mr. Waller had appeared on CNBC and became the first voting FOMC member to encourage not just taper but a very quick one so as to clear enough calendar for a hard 2022 liftoff in rates.

Just two days later, it might appear his “go early, go fast” mantra caught on with at least some parts of the yield curve. From August 5 forward, the long end of the Treasury curve has been backing up from that recent mid-year low. August 4 was the last time before what is now a multi-week somewhat modest possibly reflationary action.

Before crowning Waller’s confidence, that particular date – August 4 – should ring a bell. Wasn’t it just last year, 2020, that longer-term bond yields had likewise bottomed out on this same day?

Yes, yes it was:



Obviously, the past two years began under very different circumstances; 2020 taking over from 2019 already close if not in recession (especially outside the US) and then the COVID errors. This year, 2021, opened in nearly opposite fashion with allegedly the whole world picking itself back up from all that damage and doing so boosted by every “stimulus” means known to man. Not just rebound, a fiery inflation-filled recovery. 

Yet, in the middle of both there’s more the same than different – questions about the initial “V” shaped recovery (which did not pan out) last year and then a pretty conspicuous “growth scare” this year many are plain hoping they can blame on delta COVID for the “unexpected” soft patch.

You probably also remember how that same label “growth scare” was also thrown around quite liberally in 2019, too. Back then, the only part of the yield curve anyone is told to pay attention to had inverted, not just provoking rate cuts out of a befuddled Jay Powell but raising mainstream alarms as to impending recession (which may actually have happened, but we’ll never know for sure given the timing of the coronavirus pandemic).

Wouldn’t you know it, the low point for LT UST’s in 2019 turned out to have been…August 28!



If twice could be random coincidence, yet three times is a pattern, what is four or five? Believe it or not, this same calendar shape can be found inside every one of the last five years – even 2018 when yields were more distorted as they neared their Reflation #3 peak. That year, the same sort of mid-year downward drift reaching its floor by August 20, 2018.

And the year before, during globally synchronized growth’s reported arrival, UST rates were, for the most part, moving lower (curve flattening) as the market kept rejecting the idea that there was some legitimately inflationary recovery taking shape. The low in yields for 2017? September 5 (OK, so not August but more than close enough).



Even 2015 and 2016 were pretty close in matching this seasonality; during the latter, yields bottomed out early July and then went up (a lot) later in the Autumn. The year before, 2015, as Euro$ #3 “matured”, again a mid-year low on August 24 (following CNY’s big theatrics) which had been the same day as the eurodollar shortage striking Wall Street equities (flash crash).

While there were a couple days later on in 2015 when the 10-year yield dropped a few bps lower than August 24, still the same general trend overall.

And that trend seems to have become intriguingly normal, manifested as a regular uptick in yields especially during September and October and then lasting through the end of each year (2018 the obvious exception given the eruption of Euro$ #4’s landmine). Quite simple enough, LT yields go up after August

Given this clear regularity, could any of these annual BOND ROUTs!!!! be considered reflationary?

Getting back to the original question, there’s quite a lot of evidence for something(s) other than Governor Waller’s melodramatic CNBC interview – or even the taper announcement and dots this week – which seems more likely to account for the bond market’s longer end behavior over the past five weeks. And this would also encompass the “big” selloff yesterday and today.

These last two days, then, have not been some unusual, tantrum-y eruption (look above at how far yields jumped in early September 2019 even as recession moved into the global forefront). Quite to the contrary, what’s happened so far over the past two months is entirely consistent with what seems to happen every year. Taper doesn’t. 

This could even mean I’m actually off-the-hook, my britches still fashioned tightly right where they need to be. The Fed’s people will continue trying to provoke a bond tantrum because of their need for the public to believe taper is in charge of interest rates, yet right at this moment there’s only evidence that bonds are just doing what they normally do without regard for dots and QE’s.

This only raises the question, of course, what the hell must be going on during the month of August? Sorry for the cliffhanger, but that I’ll save for another day. Feel free, however, to tweet or comment your theories and hopefully during next week’s podcast Emil Kalinowski and I will be able to discuss them.

 



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