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Supply Chain Shipping Hell: “Just Get Me A Box” Says Logistics Manager

Supply Chain Shipping Hell: "Just Get Me A Box" Says Logistics Manager

Authored by Mike Shedlock via MishTalk.com,

Two years ago, the cost…

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This article was originally published by Zero Hedge

Supply Chain Shipping Hell: “Just Get Me A Box” Says Logistics Manager

Authored by Mike Shedlock via MishTalk.com,

Two years ago, the cost for a 40-foot container to transport goods from Asia to the U.S was under $2,000. Today it’s as much as $25,000.

When I saw this Bloomberg headline I thought it was about cardboard boxes. Instead, ‘Just Get Me a Box‘ is about shipping containers. 

It’s mid-August, and logistics manager RoxAnne Thomas’s phone won’t stop pinging. Her faucets, sinks, and toilets are waylaid near Shanghai, snagged in Vancouver, and buried under a pile of shipping containers in a rail yard outside Chicago. 

“Every step of the process, there’s still backlog,” said Thomas, 41, in one of several interviews from late July through August. “The beginning of the supply chain in China—I don’t think that’s going to get better for a year.” And the outlook more broadly? “A year and a half before things are truly back to normal.”

Although the pandemic has shuttered factories and shaken supplies of raw materials, Thomas’s chief challenge is freight, and it starts with what used to be cheap, plentiful commodities: shipping containers.

Two years ago, a 40-foot container cost less than $2,000 to transport goods from Asia to the U.S. Today the service fetches as much as $25,000 if an importer pays a premium for on-time delivery, which is a luxury

The fear is we’re ordering all this stuff for demand, and the demand is going to fizzle out before the product gets here,” Thomas says. With summer winding down, the big test of the global trading system’s resilience might still be ahead.

Commodity Shipping Rates Post Biggest Daily Gain in a Decade

Bloomberg also reports Commodity Shipping Rates Post Biggest Daily Gain in a Decade

Average rates for giant Capesize bulk carriers — which can carry products like coal, iron ore and grains — jumped by $6,700 a day on Monday, the most since 2010, as owners continue to benefit from strong demand for raw materials. The rally extended Tuesday, pushing the daily rate to almost $53,700, the highest level in 11 years, Baltic Exchange data show.

Parabolic Rise in Shipping Rates

Also consider this September 16 report: Ship Owner Genco Says Commodity Freight Rates Set to Spike.

Spot rates for container ships to move manufactured products have surged for 20 straight weeks and now stand 731% above their seasonal average over the prior five years, according to Drewry Shipping. John Wobensmith, the president and chief executive officer of Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd., said that prices to move commodities — which have already rallied sharply this year — may follow a similar cycle in the coming years with not enough ships being built to meet demand.

You do get to a point, and you’ve seen this in containers, where you hit a certain utilization rate and you start to go parabolic on rates,” he said in an interview. “I think we’re getting close to that period.

Beige Book Comments

  • San Francisco Fed: Prices rose substantially over the reporting period. Although lumber prices have dropped significantly, prices for other building materials, such as metals, cement, and wallboard have continued to climb. Other price increases were noted for energy, information technology, textiles, airline tickets, and agricultural products, such as fruits, meats, and seafood. The reported biggest drivers of these price hikes included higher shipping and logistical costs, continued supply chain disruptions, and rising labor costs

  • Atlanta Fed: District contacts continued to cite increasing nonlabor costs, especially for steel and freight, with multiple contacts referencing record increases in shipping container rates. The price of lumber stabilized but remained elevated relative to pre-pandemic levels, while mentions of increased food product costs became more widespread. Contacts cited the ability to pass through price increases with greater frequency, and with minimal resistance

  • Richmond Fed: Demand for cars continued to exceed supply while inventories were low, leading to lower carrying costs and increased margins for auto dealers. Clothing sales rose, and demand for furniture and home goods remained strong. Retailers noted shortages of and increased lead times for merchandise, particularly on foreign-made goods. One contact reported refunding several bridal parties because dresses did not arrive on time for weddings. Many retailers were able to maintain margins despite increases in costs of products and shipping.

  • National Comments: The other sectors of the economy where growth slowed or activity declined were those constrained by supply disruptions and labor shortages, as opposed to softening demand. In particular, weakness in auto sales was widely ascribed to low inventories amidst the ongoing microchip shortage, and restrained home sales activity was attributed to low supply.

The Beige Book is a summary of economic activity in each of the Fed’s 12 regions. It was released on September 8 and come out approximately 2 weeks before the Fed meets to set interest rate policy.

The Fed’s FOMC rate-setting committee meets again on September 21-22 with the announcement on the 22nd.

What About Cardboard Boxes? 

  1. August 6 Fortune: Online Retailers Get Boxed in by Higher Cardboard Prices

  2. April 6 Supply Chain Dive: Cardboard Prices Reach Record High Amid e-Commerce Demand

  3. July 9 DC Velocity: Strong Demand, Rising Costs Affect Packaging Strategies

DC Velocity

The price of corrugated products was rising through the spring, with some of the country’s largest producers of containerboard—the material used to make corrugated boxes—announcing increases of $50 to $70 per ton. The cost of packaging supplies in general was rising too, increasing by double-digits in many cases, according to government data and industry groups that track packaging demand. John Blake, senior director analyst with consulting and research firm Gartner, says changes in demand for packaging throughout the pandemic, combined with volatile supply chain activity last year, are driving the increases and shining a spotlight on the need for shippers to better manage sourcing strategies and packaging processes.

Shipping Rates Peaked?

In contrast to John Wobensmith’s call for shipping rates to go parabolic, Hapag-LLoyd AG  says Spot Rates Have Peaked.

One of the world’s biggest shipping lines has decided to stop increasing spot freight rates on routes out of Asia to Europe and the U.S. as it sees an end to the rally that has seen prices hit records. 

Hapag-LLoyd AG thinks spot rates have peaked and further increases are “not necessary,” according to Nils Haupt, the Hamburg-based company’s head of corporate communications. The move comes after French rival CMA CGM SA last week froze rates, saying it was prioritizing long-term relationships following a rally that has seen some spot rates jump more than sixfold in the past year.

While many shipping lines have taken advantage of rising spot prices, the rally is expected to “come to an end at some point,” said Jim Bureau, chief executive officer of logistics digital platform provider JAGGAER.

“The supply chain is extremely fragile right now,” he said. “How much more cost can carriers practically take on without increasing financial risk on both buyer and supplier?”

Prices Already Went Parabolic

This setup reminds me of the spike in lumber. 

Prices have already gone parabolic. The question at hand is when and how fast prices crash. 

But even if shipping costs fall in half, they will remain very elevated June 2020.

*  *  *

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Tyler Durden
Sat, 09/18/2021 – 12:30







Author: Tyler Durden

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Economics

The ‘Maestro’ Is Why Jay Powell Keeps Seeing (inflation) Ghosts

See, this is backward. And while it may seem overly pedantic, getting it right is actually a crucial insight (lack thereof) into pretty much everything….

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See, this is backward. And while it may seem overly pedantic, getting it right is actually a crucial insight (lack thereof) into pretty much everything. Its purpose is to maintain a different sort of money illusion (the original relates to how workers focus on nominal rather than real levels of compensation). This other money illusion relates to the hidden nature of money itself.

We’re told central bankers are it, therefore everything must be related to central bank monetary policy. If the dollar’s falling, the Fed accommodated. If it’s rising, Fed tightening. Rates go down because, everyone says, Jay Powell bought bonds. Yields go up because of rate hikes after the bond buying is over.

You go to the bathroom in the middle of the night, the FOMC must’ve voted for it.

It all goes back to before Greenspan, though it was the “maestro” who most clearly articulated the gross illiteracy and unsupported conceits behind much of Economics.

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. It’s really quite important to make a judgment as to whether, in fact, yield spreads off riskless instruments—which is what we have essentially been talking about—are independent of the level of the riskless rates themselves. The answer, I’m certain, is that they are not independent.

Risky spreads are, according to this view, in a sense controllable from monetary policy even from only the short end. Why? Because all riskless rates, Greenspan also said, were nothing more than a “series of one-year forwards.”

It was, in theory, all so easy and neat; the Fed from its single position could conduct all the instruments in the symphony as it wished, however and whenever wished. Thus, maestro.

Why, then, all the constant “conundrums” and “inflation puzzles” ever since? Dear Alan said he was certain, and he’s certainly been wrong.

The yield curve is no series of one-year forwards, nor are risky spreads utterly dependent upon hapless Economists at the Fed (see: swap spreads, as a start). Those at the Fed instead have repeatedly shown they have no idea how even short run interest rates work (see: SOFR) which means they can’t be literate in money like economy.

What do they do?

Influence public opinion via financial media. To wit:

The unquestioned assumption embedded here is palpable anyway; nominal rates are rising (“worst year for fixed-income since 2005” BOND ROUT!!!!) because inflation is “hot enough.” Reported like its some foregone conclusion, this inflation certainty dictated to the bond market via a suddenly hawkish Federal Reserve.

This is, at best, incomplete; most often, just plain backward. Thanks, Maestro. 

Had the yield curve behaved recently like it had earlier in this same year, this would be plausible. The yield curve, on the contrary, is performing very differently negating any chance for this to be the case.


Bond yields aren’t reacting to anything; they’ve helpfully sorted CPI’s for us all along. As I wrote earlier today, the yield curve has expertly, consistently interpreted the money Economists and central bankers can’t understand so as to accurately predict – for longer than a century – what is and will be inflation.

This often leads to conflict; central bankers say it’s one thing and bonds declare another, often the opposite. This differing viewpoint not just a post-2007 development, either, also noted today, bonds vs. Economists has been a one-way contest going back before 1929.

Our current case, therefore, very much like previous cases.

A flattening yield curve, conspicuously so, is the bond market recognizing: 1. It isn’t inflation, just transitory price factors, meaning lack of heat in the economy; 2. Policymakers repeatedly have shown they have no clue how or where to even begin figuring one way or the other; 3. Because they are clueless, they have likewise displayed a consistent tendency to make egregious forecast errors, such as 2018 or 2013; 4. Therefore, very much independent of the Fed, bond yields are instead disagreeing with Powell’s mistake by pricing a scandalously flattening yield curve with nominal rates already contradictorily low (tight money).

Bonds – not the Fed – have already sorted the inflation question. The problem is, as usual, the answer isn’t to the liking of mainstream Economics which can only interpret yields from the “certitude” of Greenspan. In that sense, inflation is a foregone conclusion. In the dream-world of media, the theme this year is solidly inflation. In monetary reality, unambiguously deflationary.

Just in time for Halloween, Jay Powell is back to seeing ghosts.

 










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US stock close mixed on Powell’s hawkish remark

Dow Jones closed higher while S P 500 and Nasdaq drifted on Friday October 22 after Fed Chair Jerome Powell s tapering remarks weighed on investors…

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Dow Jones closed higher, while S&P 500 and Nasdaq drifted on Friday, October 22, after Fed Chair, Jerome Powell’s tapering remarks weighed on investors’ sentiment. However, the optimism over the robust earnings has pushed the indices towards their third consecutive week of gains.

The S&P 500 was down 0.11% to 4,544.90. The Dow Jones Industrial Average increased by 0.21% to 35,677.02. The NASDAQ Composite Index fell 0.82% to 15,090.20, and the small-cap Russell 2000 was down 0.21% to 2,291.27.

On Friday, the Federal Reserve Chair, Jerome Powell said that the central bank should start dialing back its asset-buying program soon while suggesting that the interest rate shouldn’t be increased as of now. While the strong earnings results have lifted the investors’ confidence in recent weeks, the remarks from the Fed Chair raised concerns of the investors.

The Fed has reassured that the interest rate will be kept at the “near-zero” level until the economy returns to its expected employment and the inflation would come under the Fed’s expectation level of 2%. Meanwhile, the supply-chain disruptions and the rising costs of the raw materials indicated that inflation is likely to stay above the level for some time.

The financial and the real-estate sector topped the S&P 500 index on Friday, with communication services and consumer discretionary sectors as the bottom movers. Eight of the 11 critical sectors of the S&P 500 index stayed in the positive territory.

The stocks of Cleveland-Cliffs Inc. (CLF) gained 12.10% in intraday trading, after reporting better-than-expected quarterly earnings on Friday, before the bell. The company has reported record revenue of US$6 billion in Q3, FY21, while its net income came in at US$1.28 billion.

The shares of American Express Company (AXP) rose 5.50% after the company has reported strong quarterly earnings results as more people used their cards for traveling, dining, and other leisure activities. The total revenue of the company surged around 25% YoY to US$10.92 billion, while its net income was up 70% from the previous year’s same quarter to US$1.82 billion.

The stocks of Honeywell International Inc. (HON) plunged 2.90% after the company has lowered its full-year sales forecast due to the bottleneck supply constraints. The company’s sales rose 9% YoY to US$8.47 billion in Q3, FY21, while its EPS was up 68% YoY to US$1.80 apiece. However, the company has lowered its sales forecast to be between US$34.2 billion and US$34.6 billion from its previous forecast of US$34.6 billion and US$35.2 billion.

In the financial sector, JP Morgan Chase & Co. (JPM) increased by 1.15%, Bank of America Corporation (BAC) rose 1.27%, and Morgan Stanley (MS) surged 1.54%. Citigroup, Inc. (C) and Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (GS) gained 1.28% and 1.65%, respectively.

In real-estate stocks, American Tower Corporation (AMT) advanced 1.86%, Equinix, Inc. (EQIX) jumped 1.52%, and Public Storage (PSA) soared 1.21%. Digital Realty Trust, Inc. (DLR) and SBA Communications Corporation (SBAC) ticked up 1.03% and 1.71%, respectively.

In the communication sector, Alphabet Inc. (GOOGL) decreased by 3.13%, Facebook, Inc. (FB) fell 5.91%, and Walt Disney Company (DIS) declined by 1.10%. Twitter Inc. (TWTR) and Snap Inc. (SNAP) plummeted 4.15% and 25.99%, respectively.

Also Read: Roper (ROP) & Seagate (STX) stocks rally after Q3 reports

Also Read: Top 7 REITs with over 50% YTD returns to explore

Overall, eight of the 11 stock segments of the S&P 500 index stayed in the positive territory.

Also Read: 5 industrial stocks with over 40% YTD returns to explore

Futures & Commodities

Gold futures were up 0.71% to US$1,794.60 per ounce. Silver increased by 0.86% to US$24.378 per ounce, while copper fell 1.24% to US$4.5018.

Brent oil futures increased by 1.55% to US$85.92 per barrel and WTI crude was up 2.06% to US$84.20.

Bond Market

The 30-year Treasury bond yields was down 2.47% to 2.075, while the 10-year bond yields fell 1.91% to 1.643.

US Dollar Futures Index decreased by 0.17% to US$93.602.









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Do Bonds Accurately Price Inflation? Since Before Any of Us Were Born

Many, likely the vast majority believe that the recent wave of consumer price increases is going to stick around. It’s already painful and even if it…

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Many, likely the vast majority believe that the recent wave of consumer price increases is going to stick around. It’s already painful and even if it isn’t inflation, they’re thinking, it soon will be. Maybe not 1970’s bad, not yet, at the very least something like then.

The bond market doesn’t just disagree, it keeps doing so vehemently. Nothing new, bond yields have signaled distrust and skepticism each and every time we go through one of these inflation panics. There was 2008’s fiasco today remembered for ending up more like the thirties than the seventies; renewal under QE “money printing” which very quickly deflated by 2011 and forgotten; then 2014’s “best jobs market in decades” simply vanished; finally, the 2018 “globally synchronized” comedy of hawkish errors.

Low yields aren’t just expressing some cynical opinion that we can quantitatively measure, the implications have been repeatedly proven true because those prices are largely made by those inside the shadows doing all the money. Or not enough, as the case has been.

Inflation, real inflation which lasts, is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. There hasn’t been the money for a long time, therefore there hasn’t been inflation. Instead, consumer prices, at times, have increased even jumped if only due to other factors which uniformly get verified as transitory.

That’s why I (and a very few others) become remorseless about being obsessively specific and demand full accuracy as to whether or not to call something inflation. Without the money, it won’t be so whatever else has to be responsible for consumer prices can only ever be transitory.

This time is different, everyone now says. Screw bonds! Sure, they’ve been on the spot predicting the Fed’s downfall since before 2008 (see: below) but more and more of late the Federal Reserve itself says you can’t rely on yields if or when the real inflation their QE policies have been desperate to inflict does arrive.

There’s been a curious uptick in scholarship purporting to study the best inflation prediction combinations. Most of them are just absurd fantasy, transparent attempts to discredit policymakers’ bond market nemesis. I’ll even give you a recent example, just a few days ago, published by the Cleveland Fed.

The study’s findings unsurprisingly disparage consumers, estimating that consumer surveys of inflation are the least helpful. Those conducted from businesses aren’t really any better, according to the Cleveland branch, while, predictably, the authors extol the virtuous capacities of “professional forecasters” as modern-day inflation oracles.

Professionals who just so happen to be – pure coincidence, I’m sure – formally trained Economists like the researchers in Cleveland and the rest of the Federal Reserve.

One other inflation predicting method included “financial markets.” This didn’t score so hotly, according to the paper:

Based on in-sample and out-of-sample predictive exercises, we find that the expectations of professional economists and businesses, as demonstrated by the Blue Chip and Atlanta Fed measures, have provided substantially more accurate predictions of CPI inflation one-year out compared to those of households. The accuracy of the Cleveland Fed inflation expectations model, which could be viewed as reflecting the expectations of the financial markets, is somewhat behind these other two measures.

Wait, back up; the Fed’s branch used an “inflation expectations model?” This is supposed to be a proxy for financial markets, but instead is:

Inflation expectations of financial markets, as captured by the model behind the one-year-ahead Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland inflation expectations series. The Cleveland model (Haubrich, Pennacchi, and Ritchken (2012)) estimates inflation expectations using data that include nominal yields from US Treasury securities, survey forecasts, and inflation swap rate data.

It’s bad enough they’ve thrown a bunch of things into the wash and hope to extract something useful via subjective stochastics, but one of those things purportedly of financial markets is “survey forecasts.” I absolutely hate having to point out the implication of what sure seems like an intentional act of dirty pool.

Truth is, we don’t need all the fancy econometrics to evaluate these things; after all, these Economists have been employing exactly those for a very long time and they understand, appreciate, and can usefully forecast less and less by the year. On the contrary, we’ll just draw some simple charts and rely on nothing more than our eyes and common sense.

And we’ll start back in history with the last true bout of unbridled inflation, the supposed template for what so many people have been led to believe is about to make its ugly reappearance: The Great Inflation.

This part is exceedingly easy and straightforward since the bond market does all the work; you just need to be freed from the grasp of illiterate Economics.

Yields went down, not up, during the Great Depression (not pictured but I went into detail why here). They did so because of generally tight money (interest rate fallacy) that the Federal Reserve and its bank reserves (even based on gold flows) couldn’t manage. Banks, not central banks, are where the money comes from.

This deflationary situation did not change through and after World War II. Even during those three periods when consumer prices surged (sounds familiar), to the left of the red arrow above, bond yields didn’t budge an inch (I’ve already covered how it wasn’t the Fed’s yield caps which had kept yields low here). The financial market looked past those as temporary deviations which wouldn’t last because they weren’t actual inflation.

Transitory supply shocks don’t bother yields especially at the long end of the curve which measures money conditions through the prism of longer run inflation and growth perceptions. If it isn’t money, therefore transitory, longer bonds don’t price it.

Starting in the second half of the fifties, though, yields began at first gently rising (late fifties, eurodollar?), indicating that the tide was turning and whatever leftover remainders from the deflationary Great Depression were finally, mercifully being overcome.

What followed a double dip recession in 1958 then 1960 was a few years of low inflation. Yet, even during those, bond yields were moving higher anticipating what was about to come.

The 3-month bill rate bottomed out in July 1961 while longer end Treasuries would gently increase from January 1963. These then accelerated sharply in July 1965 well ahead of the first main eruption of consumer prices by February 1966.

That’s not all; a near-recession in 1967 granted a minor reprieve to consumers, a slowdown (slack) which Economists and central bankers mistakenly judged the end of the inflationary trend. The bond market, by contrast, picked up on the renewal of inflation three-quarters of a year ahead of time (bills almost half a year).

Bonds vs. Economists isn’t a new thing in the same way the Harlem Globetrotters didn’t just start pounding the Washington Generals yesterday.

Adding the Fed’s Discount Rate policy to the above chart (below) just highlights how bonds were way ahead as policymaker actions repeatedly fell behind:


The whole process repeated during and following the 1969-70 recession, too. LT yields bottomed out in March 1971, began moving higher even as the CPI leveled off and continued to decelerate for another fifteen months until June 1972.

Furthermore, this upward move in yields presaged a spike in consumer prices around early 1973 which itself predated the OPEC embargo’s painful inflationary oil contributions later that same year. As you can see on the chart above, bond yields incorporated the inflation part of the 1973 jump while trading underneath (CPI rates above yields) the embargo/crude oil components of it; in the same way as yields undercut those earlier pre-inflation supply shocks after WWII.

In other words, the bond market neatly and expertly compartmentalized inflation from other consumer price factors at the same time as helpfully foreseeing the former.

Contrary to what some Economists have claimed, the “financial markets” of little more than simply Treasury yields absolutely nailed the Great Inflation even as policymakers and experts fumbled around searching for answers and clues they would never find. Then-Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns in August of 1971 had the nerve to say to Congress:

The rules of economics are not working in quite the way they used to.

The rules were always fine; Burns and those like him just didn’t understand how the monetary system had changed the way money worked within them. The bond market, the banks doing all the money, they had no problem sorting everything out.

OK, fine. This was a half century ago. What about something closer to today, the 21st century?

To start with, we’ve got yields moving higher in the middle of 2003 a year before the Fed’s eventual “rate hikes” which only then created confusion (“conundrum”) for Alan Greenspan when bond long end rates began to bunch up in anticipation of the decidedly high deflationary probabilities of the late eurodollar mania period.

The yield curve flattened, and then nominal rates began to fall by June 2007 long before any minus signs showed up in the CPI early in 2009.

What’s perhaps most powerful about the chart above is how the bond market (correctly) has treated each of the subsequent consumer price deviations dating back to the monetary breakdown during 2007: first in 2008, then again in 2011, and now in 2021.

Like those temporary supply shocks caught in the CPI’s of the immediate post-war aftermath, or the peak CPI created by the oil supply shock of 1973-74, bond yields also undercut each of those post-2007/broken eurodollar consumer price spikes…and are doing so yet again in 2021.

To really drive home this point, here are the two main charts one after the other, each one expertly sorting inflation from not-inflation by way of shadow money. 

Quite simply, if it is actual inflation, yields go up as the market will price the real thing before it makes it into the CPI levels.

If there isn’t money for inflation, and those trading Treasuries know about shadow money that central bankers and Economists don’t and haven’t for more than half a century, then bond yields won’t chase these other CPI’s because those spikes aren’t inflation meaning they must be something else which, without the money, won’t last.

Historically consistent. 

One of the key mistakes that Cleveland researchers and indeed all Economists make is treating all CPI increases as if they are the same; they keep searching for the best way to predict the annual CPI, rather than the proper way to sort out consumer prices! The reason officials keep committing such an egregious error is that Economics doesn’t even consider money. How could Economists? They haven’t taken the monetary system seriously since the Great Inflation shoved their ignorance into the limelight (criminally, the very same money ignorance the Great Depression had paraded before the world in a different way just a few decades earlier).

In lieu of this great deficiency, Economics has made it seem as if inflation is some voodoo mystery only its priestly class can describe from complicated mathematics rituals. You don’t need any of that, or them. All of this is publicly available, data, prices, everything, and it doesn’t take anything more than common sense divorced from that corrupted worldview.










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