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Now They’ve Crossed The Line

Now They’ve Crossed The Line

Authored by Jeffrey Tucker via,

There are so many examples of depredations in American public…

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This article was originally published by Zero Hedge

Now They’ve Crossed The Line

Authored by Jeffrey Tucker via,

There are so many examples of depredations in American public life that it’s impossible to keep up. Things happen daily now that would have caused national outrage a few years ago.

But our sense of outrage has become dulled after nearly 20 months of the most irresponsible public policies in many generations. These days, news of terribleness just washes over us, and we hardly have time to think about it before the next shock comes along.

This one, however, should seriously give us pause because it impacts fundamental issues of security and privacy. It’s a demonstration of a reality we have to face today.

It is this: Your property is no longer safe from confiscation in the U.S. To be sure, you can say that this has been true since the income tax was passed in 1913. There is truth to that.

Still, we’ve generally been able to count on the rule of law. So long as you comply, you can generally assume that your stuff is safe. That is no longer true.

One way to think about lockdowns is as a test. What can the government get away with? How outrageous does the intervention have to be before people rise up and resist? How much of an advantage does the government have over the rest of us, and how can that power be deployed?

No More Safety

In Beverly Hills, California, there is a private service that provides lockboxes for people’s valuables. It is called U.S. Private Vaults. It seems more promising, to some degree, than a box at a bank, where the government has a long history of breaking in.

There was never any particular reason to think that the company could not keep its promises. Many people did trust this company with vast amounts of personal wealth. However, being a private company provides no real protection when the government has an agenda.

After all, we learned over the last 20 months that there is nothing that limits governments’ rights to have their way with private business. They can break in, shut them down, keep them closed, bankrupt them, and there is very little that can be done to stop it.

Six months ago, the FBI raided this company, broke into 800 different boxes by force and took all the contents. They claimed this was justified because they had probable cause that the box contents were gained from illicit activity. They have yet to prove that, however.

Here Today, Gone Tomorrow

The company’s website has posted a notice. It now has a notice:


You would think this would be national news, but instead the event got no attention. The total loot: $86 million. It included cash, coins, and jewelry. The Feds want to keep it all.

But here is another fascinating thing. That $86 million figure is what the Feds said, but look at the actual items listed in the boxes. It seems like the agents became lazy at some point and started marking everything as having the value of one dollar.

Here is just one example from one box. It had a Cartier bracelet with diamond, a Cartier bracelet “nail shape,” a diamond tennis bracelet, an 18” gold necklace, a two-tone Rolex men’s watch, another Rolex with gold and diamonds and a platinum Rolex.

Each item was valued at $1. It was the same with a tremendous amount of the gold and platinum coins that were taken. Again, each was valued at $1.

I’ve not added it all up, but we are certainly talking about a lot more than $86 million. It seems safe to add a zero to this figure. We are looking at the property of many serious people who trusted this company could keep their stuff protected and safe. Now it is all in government hands.

The owners have to beg to get it back and must prove that it is all licit.

Among those pillaged was Joseph Ruiz, an unemployed chef. He had $57,000 in cash inside his box. He had to sue to get it back. The government claimed that he made that money by running an unlicensed pot business. They further claimed that dogs had sniffed out drugs on his cash.

Ruiz produced evidence that this was not true. The FBI returned his money, without apologizing or admitting error. He told the Los Angeles Times that this was “a bank heist in broad daylight.”

They have kept everyone else’s money. Six months have gone by. Some 300 of the victims are fighting for their rights in court. The rest of the 500 or so clients have probably just given up doing anything about it.

Where Is Your Stuff Safe?

The usual assumption in the past is that bank boxes are not as safe as private boxes. That might not be true anymore. That said, does it appear that there are no real safe places remaining?

In the early 1930s, when government confiscated gold, many people found workarounds in private estates around the country. They quietly stored their gold in basements and in holes in the ground, where it stayed for decades. World War II came and went.

It wasn’t until 1974 when gold was demonetized that it became legal to own again. Members of family estates then contacted the private estates and quietly got their money back. By this time, so many presidents had come and gone, and so much had changed in the country, that no one particularly cared. Good strategy, but it’s a long game and rather risky.

There is no safe way out for anyone or anything when civilization is headed to destruction. No person is safe. No property is safe. You are better off knowing that than not.

It pays to be alert and careful, knowing full well that we are living with a system of government that has become highly dangerous to everything and everyone we hold dear.

Tyler Durden
Thu, 09/30/2021 – 12:54

Author: Tyler Durden

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Precious Metals

Gold price outlook with November Fed meeting in focus

Gold price is still below $1,800 after dropping below this crucial level in the previous session. Investors’ focus is on Fed’s meeting in the coming…

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Gold price is still below $1,800 after dropping below this crucial level in the previous session. Investors’ focus is on Fed’s meeting in the coming week.

November’s Fed meeting

In the ensuing sessions, gold price will likely record subtle movements as investors avoid huge bets ahead of the FOMC meeting scheduled for the first week of November. Fed officials are set to taper the $120 billion monthly asset purchases as inflationary pressures persist. November’s meeting will be the beginning of a path to end the bond-buying program by mid- next year.

Since the beginning of the year, the US central bank has downplayed concerns of the economy overheating by indicating that the rise in prices would be temporary. However, the officials appear more concerned about the persistent rise in inflation.

During a virtual conference held in the past week, the Fed Chair, Jerome Powell acknowledged that supply constraints have worsened. As a result, there are “more-persistent bottlenecks” that are pointing to higher inflation. Subsequently, Powell noted that the Fed needs to be flexible in coming months in order to position its policy to suit the various possible scenarios.

Notably, investors are evaluating the prospects of interest rate hikes. Based on the CME Group-tracked futures market prices, the likelihood of at least two rate hikes by the end of 2022 surged to 75% in the past week. The figure is a considerable rise from 20% after September’s FOMC meeting.

Ahead of November’s Fed interest rate decision, $1,800 will remain a crucial level for gold price. Typically, precious metals have an inverse correlation with the value of the US dollar. The dollar index has held steady above the major resistance-turn-support zone of $93.50 since the beginning of October. The index tracks the value of the greenback against a basket of six currencies.

With a steady dollar, the precious metal will likely have its gains curbed at October’s high of $1,814.13. Besides, eased stimulus and rise in interest rates is bound to boost Treasury yields. This would further exert pressure on the non-yielding bullion.

However, gold price downward movements may be limited. With the ongoing economic risks, its safe-haven appeal and status as a hedge against inflation will probably boost it above September’s low of $1,720.      

The post Gold price outlook with November Fed meeting in focus appeared first on Invezz.

Author: Faith Maina

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REZ levels up with maiden Granny Venn gold pour

Special Report: Richard Poole-led REZ has joined the ranks of producers with the maiden gold pour completed from its Granny … Read More
The post REZ…

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Richard Poole-led REZ has joined the ranks of producers with the maiden gold pour completed from its Granny Venn deposit.

Sydney-based Resources & Energy Group (ASX:REZ) has showed off the very first gold bullion produced from its Granny Venn mine, part of the Menzies project in Western Australia.

The first toll treatment for the Granny Venn cut back has reached the midway mark, which resulted in the first gold pours for the project yesterday morning at the Lakewood mill.

A total of 22.84kg of gold doré was produced from the pour and is now being dispatched to the Perth Gold Mint for determination of assay for out-turn certification.

Resources and Energy Group
Plate 2 gold pour and CIL leach bar 14.88kg

Before REZ and BM Mining restarted mining at Granny Venn in early July this year, no mining activity had taken place in 23 years.

Around 17,000 tonnes of Granny Venn ore has been processed since the toll milling campaign began in mid-August.

REZ and BM Mining partnered up under a profit-sharing agreement back in March to exploit the economically recoverable remnant resources at the Menzies project.

BM Mining is part of the BM Geological Services (BMGS) group of companies that have been active in the mining industry in the Goldfields of Western Australia since 2003.

Executive Director Richard Poole said the maiden gold pour represented a pivotal moment in REZ’s growth as it transitioned from exploration to production.

“We would like to congratulate BM Mining, which has done an exceptional job in assisting us in reaching this production milestone and completing the maiden gold pour at the Lakewood mill.” – Executive Director Richard Poole  

“Since acquiring ground in the East Menzies Goldfield, the company has moved rapidly to identify and commercialise resources, whilst maintaining a vigorous exploration strategy which has delivered some outstanding results for gold at Gigante Grande, and for nickel at Springfield.”

REZ’s near-term goal is to mine 120,000 tonnes of ore at an average grade of 2.3 grams per tonne (g/t) to produce 8,800oz of gold.

At today’s high Aussie dollar gold price, that would fetch roughly $21.1m, nicely boosting REZ’s coffers to help fund its continued exploration.

The original Granny Venn open pit, which was developed by Money Mining and Paddington Gold in 1997-1998, was based on a pit design optimised at a gold price of $454/oz. The gold price is now 5x that.

And making it even more lucrative for REZ is the fact that under the profit-sharing deal with BM Mining, REZ didn’t have to shell out a dime to get Granny Venn back in operation, with BM Mining covering the $3m capital outlay required.

The initial production campaign is scheduled to be completed in late December.




This article was developed in collaboration with Resources & Energy Group, a Stockhead advertiser at the time of publishing.


This article does not constitute financial product advice. You should consider obtaining independent advice before making any financial decisions.

The post REZ levels up with maiden Granny Venn gold pour appeared first on Stockhead.

Author: Special Report

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China’s Central Bank Condition Has Consistently Told You Everything About Global (not) Inflation

For several years now, we’ve been harping constantly and consistently about what’s on the PBOC’s balance sheet; or, really, what conspicuously isn’t…

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For several years now, we’ve been harping constantly and consistently about what’s on the PBOC’s balance sheet; or, really, what conspicuously isn’t in very specific line-item numbers. Briefly, simply, if dollars are being extended into China, as has been claimed over the years, particularly the last few, they’re going to show up on the Chinese central bank’s balance sheet.

Specifically, foreign assets. More specifically, foreign reserves.

There’s a difference between those two which historically has meant quite a bit (we’ll get to that in a moment). Going back to 2017 and 2018, the level of foreign assets (which includes reserves) has been beyond stable, constant to the point of clear manipulation. As I wrote last year:

According to the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the balance of foreign assets reported on its balance sheet for the month of June 2020 was RMB 21,833.26 billion. At the end of the prior month, May, the balance was, get this, RMB 21,833.33 billion.

Rampaging global pandemic, dollar crashing, dollar smashing, global recession questions, massive, complex economic forces to go along with huge changes in financial conditions, as well as questions about those conditions, and the Chinese system pretty much in the middle of everything. The second largest economy in the world, one which is made (and broken) by incoming (or outgoing) monetary flows of which the central bank has involved itself heavily right from the very start of modern China.

And foreign reserves on the central bank balance sheet, the fundamental basis by which Chinese money exists, this moved by the tiniest RMB 70 million? In case you are wondering, it works out to a monthly change of -0.0003%. Nuh uh. No way. That’s a number which was quite obviously engineered.

Just about sums the whole thing up; as does this chart:

What should grab your attention is the slight, though somewhat more noticeable increase in reported foreign assets during this year. We’re being asked to believe this is Jay Powell’s flood of “too much” money finally making its way into the right places; and this general data from China seems to be at least some level of consistent with the idea.

Once you get into the details, though, what’s going on over at the PBOC actually adds to the evidence of its opposite. Dollar problems, scarcity, maybe even growing and outright global money shortage.

Before we get to that, however, we have to back up and review those details. To do that, we’ll begin all the way back in the pre-crisis period when “too much” eurodollar money was a legitimate, provable condition worldwide.

Dollars between 1995 and 2007 were in such worldwide overabundance even the monetary illiterate like Ben Bernanke couldn’t help but notice them – though, captured by his rigid and rigidly incoherent ideology, the Federal Reserve’s Chairman could only muster some nonsense about a global savings glut.

His Chinese counterparts suffered no such illusions, being forced by the monetary onrush to alter both banking and monetary policies for this “hot money” excess. Up until August 2007, that is. No, this is not a coincidence.

Start with the rising blue mass above which is the PBOC’s definition for all its various foreign assets. I’ve then added the dashed black line to begin breaking out the precise pieces within the category. This line represents that vast majority – but not all – of foreign assets, labeled by China’s central bank as “foreign exchange.”

The remainder is left to two other classes. The first is official gold holdings, which for our purposes we’ll ignore (as much as it pains me, the real world ignores it, too). What’s left is what’s always left over in these things: other foreign assets.

It’s in this “other” where both the fun and monetary literacy begin.

The implications are pretty obvious, as are their connection to the burgeoning Global Financial Crisis in a way that pegs said crisis as the only thing it could have ever been: a global dollar shortage. Not subprime mortgages, a systemic rupture in the bank-centered eurodollar system so bad it forced even invulnerable China into some visible countermeasures.

And here (above) you can see one of those: other foreign assets. What is other? Your guess is as good as mine (OK, maybe I might have a slightly better idea having spent enough time poking around, but even then not so much better because this stuff is left opaque by Communist design). For right now, “what” doesn’t matter.

It does matter that whatever it might be that is in “other”, this shows up at the exact moment the global dollar rupture hits in August 2007. Immediately, two things pop out on the PBOC’s balance sheet: fewer foreign exchange assets but more of other. Eurodollar shortage, fewer dollars organically register as foreign exchange. 

In lieu of market-based dollars, though, look what happens to the growth of total foreign assets which is maintained at a nearly constant growth rate by the addition of other foreign assets. It is a workaround, a fill-in to keep up the flow at the margins. A rescue, of  sorts, to buy some time for the eurodollar world to normalize.

For the first few months of 2008, there seemed to be some hope the Federal Reserve’s (how naïve everyone was) “rescues” could work (TAF, overseas dollar swaps “somehow” being overbid by US banks with mostly German names). Foreign exchange pops back up for the PBOC – but only until March 2008.

Bear Stearns.

Taking a guess as to “contingent liabilities” within “other”, Bear was the final straw for China as most of the rest of the world. Too expensive to maintain, Chinese authorities realized they’d instead have to ride out the growing (not past tense) storm; they’d have to switch to other even more opaque tactics unreported anywhere.

After trying to offset the first phase of the GFC1 dollar shortage with “other”, the Chinese then moved to a completely stealth CNY peg (stealth because the back half of whatever transactions don’t show up anywhere). You can see this two-step above; first the jump in “other” while CNY still rises, then total CNY peg as foreign exchange assets stop growing at the same fast pre-crisis rate.

Unlike “new normal” America and Europe, the Chinese emerged from the ensuing Great “Recession” believing their situation/potential hadn’t been altered. A big enough chunk of the eurodollar system seemed to agree – for a time.

Chinese monetary authorities spent 2010 and most of 2011 letting these “other” foreign assets roll off the balance sheet; if actually contingent liabilities, then repaying, terminating and getting out with CNY rising likely making the repayments and retirements economical (and worth whatever cost, so long as nothing really changed for China’s long run).

But, as you can see (two above), a second eurodollar problem erupts in 2011 while the PBOC is still unwinding whatever it had done from late 2007/early 2008. While this meant another stoppage in inbound eurodollar flows, China’s economy appeared able to weather the breakdown (which was focused more on Europe) and with CNY still rising no emergency monetary measures appeared necessary (there was a fiscal “stimulus” package).

At least none of the same outward type which might end up in “other” foreign assets; something else was being done, from September 2011 forward, monetary officials clearly began pegging the aggregate foreign exchange balance on the PBOC’s balance sheet.

The Chinese weren’t so lucky by 2014. Although dollar inflows were restored in 2013 (Reflation #2), there was a serious break during that summer (Summer of SHIBOR) which was consistent with a then emerging emerging market currency crisis (dollar shortage) wrongly blamed on the “taper tantrum.”

Right from the start of the following year, dollars began to disappear again (falling foreign exchange). Already having introduced another batch of “other” intervention right in January 2013, officials instead went back to stealth CNY manipulation (ticking clocks).

It didn’t work, either, as China suffered massive dollar destruction which then caused internal RMB destruction (bank reserves and currency). The freight train of Euro$ #3 hit the system by August 2015, causing CNY to plummet all-at-once, even triggering a flash crash across global stock markets within two weeks from yuan’s crash.

Perhaps understanding what was coming, the PBOC simply got the hell out of its way rather than risk being further sucked into the rising negative money vortex:

A demonstration how even other foreign assets are more like a last resort kind of thing.

The central bank would stay out of the eurodollar’s way until early 2016, coming back in because of the immensely costly damage done to CNY, the RMB system, as well as China’s and the global economy as a whole. The start of ’16 one of those situations that really did demand another last resort.

When confronted by the next one, Euro$ #4, again a clear reluctance to appeal to “other” foreign assets. There had already been a lack of dollars coming back, very few, anyway, during Reflation #3 (2017’s absurdly weak “globally synchronized growth”) leaving China dollar exposed to begin 2018.

Through the middle of 2018, once again the PBOC relied on this other peg to its aggregate foreign exchange balance in the same way it had back in 2012. Only this time, CNY was dropping like a stone, with officials apparently content to accept that outcome.

By October 2018, however, the situation must’ve been judged untenable, at least substantially more serious and dangerous, such that “other” foreign assets began to rise slightly but clearly to somewhat offset foreign exchange assets then declining.

The stealth peg to PBOC’s foreign exchange must’ve been overwhelmed by Euro$ #4’s late 2018 landmine. In its aftermath, CNY would eventually decline more in 2019 despite the offset in China’s “other” foreign assets, as this globally synchronized deflation wore down economies and markets (repo) all over the world.

What does all this mean?

Quite a lot of things we don’t have time or space to get into here, some different things, but among the commonalities is how “other” foreign assets continuously represent a last ditch kind of rescue or at least attempted offset to what therefore has to be among the more serious of already serious dollar shortages. There is no question how these results all fit together.

And, as I began at the outset, it is intuitive. If dollars are actually coming in, in reality rather than Jay Powell’s lying mouth, they show up at the PBOC as foreign exchange.

If they aren’t coming in, China’s balance sheet begins to break down in these specific ways, including, at key times, some sort of increase in other foreign assets.

This brings us back, and up to speed, with the first chart I presented. There has been an increase the PBOC’s reported holdings of total foreign assets which at first might appear on the surface as at least some trickle from the “too much” money we’ve heard all year about. It’s not.

What is it? Other foreign assets. Near entirely:

Foreign exchange assets gained the tiniest sliver, but since June (when CNY went sideways) nothing.

Instead, other foreign assets have picked up going all the way back to January. Yes, the same January.

This January:

There are obviously screwy things going on with the PBOC’s balance sheet, already on top of already screwy things (why a straight line for foreign exchange) that aren’t as obvious. And we know that screwy stuff corresponds religiously to monetary shortages, another eurodollar problem rather than whatever it is Jay Powell is telling the media to report to the public.

Odd developments which long predate delta COVID, aren’t trade wars or subprime mortgages. It’s the same thing repeating since all the way back in August 2007. Again, no coincidence “other” foreign assets showed up at exactly the same moment the eurodollar system broke.

The mainstream theme or narrative for 2021 has all year been inflation, inflation, inflation. In actual monetary terms, which is what inflation must be, shockingly it’s actually been the whole opposite: deflation, deflation, deflation.

You don’t have to take my word for it. The evidence if everywhere (just start with bonds).

Whereas the TIC data is pretty unambiguous about this situation, the PBOC confirms the same from its own figures which are, once you orient them properly, only slightly less explicit even if we have no specific idea the exact transactions the Chinese are being forced into. Yet again.

Whatever those are, China sure isn’t being compelled to undertake them because there’s too much money in what remains the eurodollar’s world.

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